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INTRODUCTION 
When Jane Come and Geneva De Vane filed a complaint in the mid- l 970s 
against their employer, Bausch and Lomb, they alleged what they deemed a 
form of discrimination. 1 The two women worked as clerical staff and were 
supervised by a man named Leon Price, who, they alleged, subjected them to 
repeated verbal and physical sexual advances at work, which escalated to a 
point that both women were forced to resign.2 The complaint alleged that this 
behavior violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 enacted more than 
a decade earlier, because the imposition of unwanted sexual advances by a 
supervisor or the granting of rewards for sexual submission were forms of 
illegal sex discrimination.4 
The district judge was openly incredulous about their claim.5 All previous 
cases of sex discrimination "arose out of company policies" and involved 
"apparently some advantage to, or gain by, the employer from such 
discriminatory practices."6 But here, "Mr. Price's conduct appears to be 
nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism. . . . [He] 
was satisfying a personal urge."7 And if that was the case, how could "it be 
• Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Maurice A. Deane 
School of Law at Hofstra University. 
1 Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 16I (D. Ariz. 1975). 
2 Id. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012). 
4 Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 162-63. 
s Id. 
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construed that the conduct complained of was company-directed policy which 
deprived women of employment opportunities"?8 Indeed, the court continued, 
a "reasonably intelligent reading of the statute" shows that it cannot be read to 
cover actions, even by a supervisor, which "had no relationship to the nature of 
the employment."9 It would be "ludicrous" to find this conduct actionable 
simply because it was directed at females alone (lots of them, according to the 
complaint), and recognition of this cause of action would mean "a potential 
federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented 
advances toward another."10 Employers would be forced to "have employees 
who were asexual" since that would be the "only sure way ... [to] avoid such 
charges."11 (And one could imagine the court's wondering whether there were 
enough asexual adults in the workforce to make millions and millions of 
contact lenses.) The court thus concluded that the women had failed to state a 
claim under Title VII and dismissed the complaint. 12 
The ruling in Corne, like a similar ruling the following year in which a 
federal district court dismissed a discrimination complaint alleging sexual 
assault on the theory that Title VII was "not intended to provide a federal tort 
remedy for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the 
part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather 
than a back alley,"13 is a touchstone in the development of sexual harassment 
law. It signaled the emerging awareness of "sexual harassment," a newfound 
label for conduct that had long been experienced by (mostly) women in the 
workplace, but seldom discussed and never challenged. But the ruling also 
marked the beginning of sexual harassment law by raising questions that courts 
and commentators would spend decades trying to answer: What is sexual 
harassment? What does it have to do with equal employment opportunity? And 
who can be held liable for it? 
The history of sexual harassment law-which I have occasion to consider as 
part of this symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII-can be divided, 
if not neatly, into three eras. The 1970s was home to the emergence of 
consciousness about the frequency and harm of sexually harassing behaviors in 
the workplace-and a name to describe them. The 1980s and 1990s saw the 
development and embrace of a theoretical understanding of sexual harassment 
as a form of discrimination, outlined in Catharine MacKinnon's path-breaking 




11 Id. at 163-64. 
12 Id. at 165. 
13 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976). 
14 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). The foremother of harassment law has written her own 
reflection on the law's development. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of 
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of a comprehensive set of substantive principles about what constitutes 
actionable harassment and who can be held liable for it. Finally, the last decade 
and a half has seen critique on both ends-from some scholars who claim 
sexual harassment law has gone too far (or in the wrong direction) and from 
others who claim it has failed to transmit cultural understandings necessary for 
equality and stalled with a type of complacency about a system that has largely 
failed to eradicate the harassing behaviors that continue to impede women's 
equal opportunity in the workplace. 
In a landmark article, political scientists Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat examined 
the complex social process that connects injury to a remedy. 15 They set forth 
three stages in the emergence of disputes: naming ("saying to oneself that a 
particular experience has been injurious"); blaming (occurring "when a person 
attributes an injury to the fault of another individual or social entity"); and 
claiming (occurring "when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or 
entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy"). 16 All three 
transformations must occur in order for an aggrieved individual to gain access 
to justice. 17 At a broader level, though, these same processes must occur for a 
particular type of conduct-in this case, sexual harassment-to be addressed. 
We must collectively identify a behavior and deem it wrongful, decide who 
can be blamed (or at least held accountable), and then provide the legal and 
extralegal mechanisms through which the blameworthy can be forced to 
remedy the harm to the victims. In this Essay, I will trace the key 
Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813 
(2002). 
15 William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .. , 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 
(1980-81). 
16 Id. at 635. On this social process, see also Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden 
Domains of Civil Justice: ''Naming, Blaming, and Claiming" in Popular Culture, 50 
DEPAUL L. REv. 425 (2000) (discussing The Sweet Hereafter, a film that "tells a story in 
words and pictures of the seldom seen processes of naming, blaming, and claiming," and 
thereby "provides a vehicle for understanding the manner in which civil justice is 
mythologized"); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sara!, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: 
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 525 (1980-81) (exploring "the 
origins of disputes in grievances and claims," and finding that while claims are often made 
in a vast majority of problem types, such as real property and debt, "[t]he one exception to 
this pattern is found among discrimination grievants, of whom only 29.4 percent made a 
claim"); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 4, 11-26 (1983) ("[E]ven where injuries are perceived, a common response is 
resignation" and how this may be explained by those who "decide that the gain is too low, 
or the cost is too high, including the psychic costs of pursuing the claim."). 
17 See Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in 
the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1151, 1155 (2000) ("[A] victim must 
identify the behavior as harassment, recognize the availability of a legal remedy, and report 
her victimization to some forum in some manner."). 
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developments in sexual harassment law and theory over the last forty years, as 
we move from naming to blaming to claiming-and perhaps to questioning. 
I. THE EARLY YEARS: PUTTING A NAME TO A BEHAVIOR 
Sexual harassment preceded sexual harassment law. We can point to the 
sexual abuse and harassment of female slaves by their masters, 18 the sexual 
hostility and attacks of early twentieth century female industrial workers in the 
factories where they worked, 19 or the generations of secretaries groped by their 
bosses in the office (depicted masterfully on the big screen by Dabney 
Coleman and Dolly Parton in Nine to Five).20 And if we look only in the 
modem era but across different contexts, we find it not only in the workplace, 
but also in schools, prisons, housing authorities, on the street, and in virtually 
every type of institution. But it is naming the behavior rather than its mere 
existence that leads to the establishment of a legal structure to control it. For 
sexual harassment, this happened in the late 1970s as a number of forces 
coalesced. A popular women's magazine, Redhook, published results of a 
survey titled What Men Do to Women on the Job,21 which found unwelcome 
sexual comments and advances to be pervasive in the workplace. In 1981, the 
federal government published a groundbreaking study reporting that four in ten 
female employees had experienced harassing behaviors in the prior two 
years.22 Other studies and surveys joined a growing chorus that led to the 
collective labeling of certain behaviors as "sexual harassment" and the 
eventual melding of outrage with the protections of Title VII, a statute that had 
been on the books for more than a decade already. 23 In the background was the 
18 See KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600 
TO 1993, at 16-17 (1994); see also LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 40-44 (1978). 
19 See SEGRAVE, supra note 18, at 61-80 ("Sexual harassment continued unabated in 
factory work well into the 20th century."). 
20 See id. at 103-22; see also Jill Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some 
Observations on the Distance Traveled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 445 
(1981); NINE TO FIVE (IPC Films 1980). 
21 Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 217. 
22 See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 20 (1981). 
23 See, e.g., CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER 27-28 (1976); FARLEY, 
supra note 18, at 18-21 (discussing studies and surveys finding widespread sexual 
harassment); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE 
fEDERAL WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE (1988); Douglas D. Baker et al., The Influence of 
Individual Characteristics and Severity of Harassing Behavior on Reactions to Sexual 
Harassment, 22 SEX ROLES 305, 305-06 (1990) ("Research findings over the past fifteen 
years indicate that sexual harassment is both a pervasive and serious problem."); Susan R. 
Meredith, Using Fact Finders to Probe Workplace Claims of Sexual Harassment, 47 ARB. J. 
61, 61 (1992) (citing studies that estimate that fifty to eighty percent of female workers have 
been sexually harassed); Beth E. Schneider, Consciousness About Sexual Harassment 
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women's rights movement, and in the foreground was Catharine MacK.innon's 
theory of why harassment should be deemed an actionable wrong.24 Sexual 
harassment was, in Martha Chamallas's words, the "quintessential feminist 
harm . . . . The term was invented by feminist activists, given content by 
feminist litigators and scholars, and sustained by a wide-ranging body of 
scholarship generated largely by feminist academics."25 And with its roots 
firmly established, sexual harassment was thrust on a very public stage when 
Anita Hill accused Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas of sexually 
harassing her while he was chairing the federal agency in charge of 
implementing the nation's anti-discrimination laws.26 He was confirmed to the 
Supreme Court despite her allegations, but her airing of the issue catalyzed 
public awareness, litigation, and judicial awareness of sexual harassment. The 
rest, as they say, is history. 
IL THE ADOLESCENT YEARS: 
THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND How OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
After a few false starts in the mid-1970s, courts slowly began to recognize 
that sexual harassment in the workplace could violate Title VIL Barnes v. 
Costle,21 a 1977 case in the D.C. Circuit, is credited with being the first 
appellate decision to recognize quid pro quo harassment as actionable under 
Title VII. There, the court concluded that if a woman proved she was fired 
because she refused to have a sexual relationship with her supervisor, she had 
established actionable discrimination.28 "It is much too late in the day," the 
Among Heterosexual and Lesbian Women Workers, 38 J. Soc. ISSUES 75, 83-85 (1982) 
(discussing a study showing that "significant proportions of each sexual identity group 
experienced [sexual harassment] incidents in the year prior to the study"). For narrative 
. descriptions of this history, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 
YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (discussing the current sexual desire-dominance paradigm); Vicki 
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2074-82 (2003) (discussing the 
American women's movement) .. 
24 See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 66 
(2006) (explaining MacKinnon's influence and that the "law of sexual harassment 
represents one of the most direct translations of legal theory into legal doctrine"). 
25 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 237 (2d ed. 2003). 
26 See Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1445 (1992) (discussing her reaction to the response from her Senate Judiciary Committee 
Testimony); see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 25, at 246 (stating that the "confirmation 
hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas marked the most intense moment of public awareness 
and public debate about sexual harassment"). 
27 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Other cases in the first batch include Vinso_n v. Taylor, 
753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and 
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). 
28 Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989 n.49 ("The vitiating sex factor thus stemmed not from the fact 
that what appellant's superior demanded was sexual activity ... but from the fact that he 
imposed upon her tenure in her then position a condition which ostensibly he would not 
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court wrote, "to contend that Title VII does not outlaw terms of employment 
for women which differ appreciably from those set for men, and which are not 
genuinely and reasonably related to performance on the job."29 And "but for 
her womanhood ... her participation in sexual activity would never have been 
solicited .... [She] was asked to bow to his demands as the price for holding 
her job."30 And the federal agency for which the plaintiff worked was in no 
position, factually speaking, to exonerate itself under a theory that the 
supervisor's actions contravened company policy and were redressed as soon 
as discovered. 31 
Two years later, MacKinnon's game-changing book was published, in 
which she gave a cogent explanation for why sexual harassment should be 
treated as intentional discrimination and distinguished between two types of 
harassment-quid pro quo and hostile environment.32 Literally "this for that," 
quid pro quo harassment involved threats of adverse action to coerce sexual 
submission. 33 Hostile environment harassment came to be understood as 
unwelcome sexual conduct that is severe or pervasive and which creates a 
subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive working environment.34 Her 
framework was adopted virtually wholesale by the EEOC, which published its 
first guidelines on sexual harassment 1980.35 The guidelines defined actionable 
harassment as: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when (1) submission to such 
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
have fastened upon a male employee."). 
29 Id. at 989-90. 
30 Id. at 990. 
31 Id. at 993. Often lost in the conventional telling of sexual harassment history is that 
Barnes, like many of the women plaintiffs in the early cases, was African-American. See 
MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 826 (suggesting that women's race combined with the fact 
that "most of the men judges ... had confronted their own group-based inequalities" may 
explain the earliest cases that recognized harassment as a civil rights issue). That sexual 
harassment is often racialized is important, but seldom discussed. See generally Sumi K. 
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority 
Meets Suzie Wong, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. l 77 (1997); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three 
Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
817 (1993). 
32 MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 32. MacKinnon distinguished between harassment "in 
which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment 
opportunity," and harassment that is a "persistent condition of work." Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 
(Nov. IO, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(c) (1980)). This section of the Guidelines 
was rescinded in 1999 and replaced with new guidelines reflecting new Supreme Court 
opinions on employer liability, discussed infra. 
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individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct 
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting 
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.36 
The guidelines also proposed standards for employer liability, providing that 
vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors would tum on "the particular 
employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual."37 
The EEOC guidelines were a kind of Kool-Aid. The default had now flipped-
from the incredulous reaction by courts to the very idea that harassment could 
be actionable under Title VII to a virtual consensus that harassment was not 
only actionable, but also struck at the very heart of women's inequality in the 
workplace. But right from the start there was disagreement, or at least 
confusion, about whether employers ought to be held responsible for 
harassment by employees, even those with supervisory authority, when the 
harassment itself was so clearly outside the scope of employment in most 
cases. George MacKinnon, a D.C. Circuit judge and also Catharine 
MacKinnon's father, raised this question in a concurrence in Barnes v. Castle, 
querying whether an employer could be deemed at fault for conduct it did not 
order or condone. 38 · 
The Supreme Court, in its first foray into sexual harassment law, in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson,39 affirmed the consensus that quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment are actionable forms of discrimination. And while it 
agreed that harassment must be "unwelcome" in order to be actionable-and, 
controversially, that "a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress" 
may be relevant and admissible-it held that a complainant's participation in 
"sexual episodes" may be voluntary, but nonetheless "unwelcome."40 The 
Meritor Court, however, cemented confusion over the proper standard for 
employer liability, eschewing a clear rule in favor of a vague direction to lower 
courts to look to "agency principles" in deciding when employers could be 
held liable for sexual harassment in the workplace.41 In defining the possible 
continuum of employer liability, the Court rejected both a rule of automatic 
liability and a rule requiring actual notice.42 Lower courts then plunged into the 
amorphous concept of "agency principles" to determine whether employers 
could or should be held liable for sexual harassment under various 
36 Id. 
31 Id. 
38 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that the common law imputes no liability on the employer, and that any liability 
must come entirely from statute). 
39 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
40 Id. at 67. 
41 Id. at 72. 
42 Id. 
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circumstances.43 They tended to agree that employers were strictly liable when 
supervisors carried out quid pro quo threats-the women who didn't sleep with 
them despite being threatened were fired-but reached wildly inconsistent 
results in other types of cases.44 There was no consensus to be found in cases 
where women submitted to their supervisor's demands, where the supervisor 
failed to carry out the threatened action, or where the harassment was the 
hostile environment variety.45 
While lower courts volleyed over the employer liability standards, the 
Supreme Court decided two more cases on the definition of actionable 
harassment. In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,46 the Court considered 
how badly hostile environment harassment must injure its victim before it 
becomes actionable (before causing severe psychological injury) and from 
whose perspective it should be judged (a reasonable person in the shoes of the 
victim).47 Five years later, it considered whether same-sex harassment could be 
actionable given the statute's requirement that unlawful discrimination be 
43 The Supreme Court interpreted Title VII, under which the term "employer" is defined 
to include "agents," to require this analysis. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
44 See, e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In a 
situation of quid pro quo sexual harassment by a supervisor, where the harassmenfresults in 
a tangible detriment to the subordinate employee, liability is imputed to the employer."); 
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Once quid pro quo sexual 
harassment has been established, the harasser's employer is, ipso facto, liable."); Bo].!tOn v. 
BMW ofN. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994); Kaufmann v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 
1316 (11th Cir. 1989); Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) 
("Hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment causes of action are not always clearly 
distinct and separate."); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Bundy 
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The Guidelines go on to reaffirm that an 
employer is responsible for discriminatory acts of its agent and supervisory employees with 
respect to sexual harassment just as with other forms of discrimination, regardless of 
whether the employer authorized or knew or even should have known of the acts .... "). 
45 Compare Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the mere threat of adverse action conditioned on sexual submission constitutes a quid pro 
quo in violation of Title VII), Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511 (same), and Karibian v. Columbia 
Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), with Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (only threats that are carried out constitute an actionable quid pro quo). 
46 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
47 Plaintiff had urged the court to adopt a "reasonable woman" standard for evaluating· 
whether an environment was objectively hostile enough to be actionable. This issue had 
been ruled on by the Ninth Circuit and fully briefed, but the Supreme Court never 
mentioned the issue in its ruling. Instead, it reformulated the test to reflect the perspective of 
the "reasonable person in the victim's shoes," presumably making room for factfinders to 
account for the influence of the victim's gender on perceptions of the hostile environment. 
Id. at 20-21 ("This standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle path between making 
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible 
psychological injury."). 
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"because of sex."48 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,49 the Court held 
that Title VII does not categorically exclude same-sex harassment (as the lower 
court had held), but that an employee pursuing such a theory would have to 
specifically prove the conduct occurred because of sex (e.g., the harasser was 
motivated by homosexual desire or targeted only people of one sex).50 Nor 
does Title VII require that harassment be sexual in nature, as long as it is 
because of sex (gender). "[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual 
desire," the Court wrote, "to support an inference of discrimination on the 
basis of sex."51 
In its first three sexual harassment cases, the Supreme Court had ruled in 
favor of a broad reading of Title VII and robust substantive law against 
harassment, but of course it left many substantive issues for the lower courts to 
resolve. The Court established early on and without dispute that individuals 
could not be held liable for harassment,52 but neither were their motives 
relevant to the determination whether a hostile environment had been created.53 
Nor, in most cases, do restrictions on verbal or visual harassment violate 
fundamental principles of free speech.54 Other cases considered less central, 
but still important, questions. Courts have considered, for example, whether 
sexual favoritism is actionable under Title VII. Most have concluded that it can 
be, in accordance with the EEOC's position on the issue, but only if it is 
sufficiently widespread to change the entire tenor of the workplace.55 Thus, a 
4s 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2002). 
49 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998). 
50 Id. at 80-82. The "because of sex" question can be raised in contexts other than same-
sex harassment. For example, in Orton-Bel/ v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2014), a 
woman complained about, among other things, the fact that co-workers were having sex on 
her desk at night when she wasn't there. While the court agreed this conduct was disturbing 
and hostile, there was no evidence that the choice of her office was made because of her sex 
and therefore was not an actionable form of discrimination. Id. In a related vein, the Second 
Circuit affirmed that the actions of an equal opportunity harasser-a fire department chief 
grabbed men by their testicles and women by their breasts-did not harass "because of sex." 
Carpenter v. City ofTorrington, 100 F. App'x 858, 860 (2d Cir. 2004). 
51 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 19 (treating comments like "[w]e 
need a man as the rental manager," and references to the complainant as a "dumb ass 
woman" as part of an actionable hostile environment). 
52 See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on 
other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Williams v. 
Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, a high-ranking officer's behavior 
can be imputed to the employer under an alter ego theory of liability. See, e.g., Torres v. 
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634-35 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1997). 
53 MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 826 (discussing the irrelevance of motive). 
54 See generally J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
2295 (1999). 
55 See, e.g., Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005) (interpreting 
California's anti-discrimination law to ban sexual favoritism in the sanie circumstances as 
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prison warden who played his three paramours off one another in a quest for 
his approval and promotions, turning the prison into a highly sexualized 
environment, ran afoul of this standard.56 Courts have also considered the 
standard for evaluating sexual harassment of adolescents, concluding in one 
case, for example, that sexual advances towards individuals below the age of 
sexual consent are unwelcome as a matter of law.57 Many courts have 
considered whether context is relevant to the creation of a hostile environment. 
For example, is graphic sex talk in a comedy writers' room less likely to 
constitute harassment than in a law office? The California Supreme Court, 
interpreting a state discrimination law with similar protections, said yes-
context matters, and mere talk, if not directed at anyone in particular and not 
reflecting hostility to women as a group, was not actionable.58 
In a separate, but extremely important set of cases, the court developed the 
retaliation doctrine-protection for employees who complained of harassment 
or cooperated with investigations of complaints by others. As with the core 
sexual harassment doctrine, the Supreme Court handed down a series of 
rulings that, at least on their face, purported to sweep broadly in favor of 
victims of harassment. With some statutes, such as Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, the Supreme Court had to first decide whether 
retaliation against discrimination complainants was actionable at all because 
Congress made no mention of such protection in the text. But the Court had no 
trouble deciding in the Title IX context that protection against retaliation is an 
integral part of protection against discrimination in the first instance. Thus, it 
ruled in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education59 that protection against 
retaliation is an essential and therefore inherent component of an 
antidiscrimination law.60 The alternative would be to create a cruel Catch-22 
Title VII does). 
56 Id.; see also EEOC Guidance No. 915.048, EEOC (Jan. 12, 1990), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html, archived at http://perma.cc/334G-
7MMK; Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 858 (1988) (arguing that little sexual liberty is lost when an employer 
prohibits "amorous relationships in which one party has direct authority to affect the 
working ... status of the other"). 
57 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2008). 
58 Lyle v. Warner Bros., 132 P.3d 211, 228, 231 (Cal. 2006). Compare Rabidue v. 
Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (rejecting claim by a woman in 
a blue collar job because "Title VII was not meant" to change an environment in which 
"sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound"), and Gross v. 
Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim by a female 
truck driver because in "the real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not 
perceived as hostile or abusive. Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or endured as 
normal human behavior."), with Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 
1999) (finding the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Gross "illogical"). 
59 544 U.S. 167, 184 (2005). 
60 ld. at 174; see also Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding implied 
2015] MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 1039 
for victims-either say nothing and have no legal recourse against the 
harassment, or speak up and risk retaliation with no legal recourse to challenge 
it.61 
The Court could skip this preliminary question in Title VII because the 
statute expressly, if inartfully, prohibits retaliation against those who oppose 
unlawful discrimination or participate in complaint proceedings.62 The 
questions, then, focused on what types of actions qualified as retaliatory and 
what types of opposition or participation triggered protection against them. In 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White,63 the Court ruled 
broadly in favor of the plaintiff, Sheila White, a female track laborer who was 
removed from a more desirable position after she complained about her 
supervisor's anti-woman comments and who was written up for a false 
infraction after complaining a second time.64 In response to the two questions it 
was asked, the Court ruled first that retaliatory action could be unlawful even if 
not work-related (e.g., a threat of bodily harm) and second that retaliation is 
actionable if it is materially adverse, meaning "it well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."65 In 
White's case, a month-long suspension without pay and reassignment to a less 
desirable position were certainly sufficient to meet this standard.66 
But what the Court gave with one hand-meaningful protection against 
retaliation in Burlington Northern-it took away with the other. In a quiet, per 
curiam decision, Clark County School District v. Breeden,67 the Court 
dismissed a retaliation claim because "(n]o reasonable person could have 
believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's 
standard."68 The "single incident" was a conversation and a chuckle between 
two men about a job applicant, who had allegedly once told a co-worker "I 
hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon."69 Vicki 
Breeden, also in the meeting to screen applicants, complained about the 
right against retaliation in Title VI). 
61 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81. 
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) (prohibiting "discrimination for making charges, 
testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings"). The protection against 
retaliation is divided into two clauses: the opposition clause and the participation clause. 
The former protects those who complain formally or informally of discrimination or who 
cooperate with investigations into the complaints of others (see discussion of Crawford, 
infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text), while the latter protects only those who 
participate in the investigation of formal EEOC charges. 
63 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
64 Id. at 57-59. 
65 Id. at 67-68. 
66 Id. at 70. 
67 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 269. 
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discussion. 70 And while a single comment of this nature, even directed at the 
employee, would not be severe or pervasive enough to trigger liability under 
Title VII, the Court's sweeping and casual pronouncement that only 
objectively reasonable complaints of discrimination trigger retaliation 
protection would unleash a torrent of bad case law, discussed below. 
The ruling in Breeden would undercut the benefits of a later retaliation case, 
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 71 in 
which the Court ostensibly handed down another victory for victims of 
retaliation. It reversed a federal appellate ruling that had denied protection 
from retaliation to employees who participate as witnesses in an employee's 
internal investigation into harassment charges brought by other employees. 72 
When Vicky Crawford was interviewed in connection with a harassment 
charge brought by a co-worker, she told the investigator of many instances in 
which the accused harasser had behaved in a sexually inappropriate way in the 
workplace. 73 The "opposition clause" was broad enough to encompass the 
provision of information relevant to an investigation or charge, regardless of 
whether the employee actively "opposed" discrimination by coming forward 
independently, or passively "opposed" by merely cooperating.74 Employers 
could not tum internal investigations into charades by punishing those who 
provided relevant information, even if they did not insist on being heard.75 The 
Sixth Circuit had rul.ed that Crawford was not protected by the "participation" 
clause because the investigation with which she cooperated was internal rather 
than part of the formal enforcement mechanisms for Title VII, an EEOC 
charge. 76 The Supreme Court did not need to consider that ruling since it held 
that Crawford was protected under the opposition clause, even as it held that 
protection under the participation clause is significantly broader.77 Per 
Breeden, an employee who "opposes" conduct she perceives as discriminatory 
is only protected against retaliation if the court agrees that her belief that 
discrimination occurred was objectively reasonable, a hurdle discussed more in 
the next section. 78 
In 1998, the Court returned to the issue of employer liability for harassment, 
taking up the most common points of contention in lower courts-how much 
weight to give an employer's harassment policy in determining liability and 
70 Id. 
71 555 U.S. 271, 280 (2009). 
n Id. 
73 Crawford was herself a victim of harassment by the same man, Gene Hughes, but had 
not complained because Hughes was the person responsible for receiving harassment 
complaints. Id. at 274. 
74 Id. at 277. 
75 Id. at 273. 
76 Id. at 275. 
77 Id. at 280. 
78 See Clark Cnty. Sch, Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). 
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whether to penalize plaintiffs who failed to make use of available grievance 
procedures.79 In Faragher and Ellerth, the Court jointly held that for 
supervisory harassment culminating in a tangible employment action (new 
lingo to describe an unsuccessful quid pro quo), employers are automatically 
liable. 80 While supervisors are seldom acting within the scope of employment 
when they harass-indeed, the Court noted in Ellerth, they often act "for 
personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of 
the employer"81-they are typically aided by the existence of the agency 
relation, an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. But for 
supervisory harassment without such a consequence, employers may assert a 
two-prong affirmative defense, which operates as a bar to · liability or 
damages82 : 
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may 
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary 
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
avoid harm otherwise.83 
The Court in these cases also approved the lower court consensus that 
claims involving co-worker rather than supervisory harassment should be 
governed by a negligence standard, holding employers liable only when they 
knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take prompt and 
79 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
8° Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. A tangible employment action 
is one that constitutes "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
81 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. 
82 Whether an employer who makes out the affirmative defense escapes liability 
altogether or simply avoids paying damages is a matter of dispute. I have argued in an 
earlier piece that the affirmative defense should not operate to bar liability, but only to 
reduce damages. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for 
Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 704-09 (2000). Some courts, however, have 
construed the defense quite broadly as a complete defense to liability. See id. at 709-15 
(citing cases). 
83 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (providing 
identical language). Several courts have quite inexplicably eliminated the second prong of 
the affirmative defense entirely. See Grossman, supra note 82, at 711 (citing cases); see also 
Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that the 
employer need not prove the second prong of the affirmative defense when the first prong is 
satisfied); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (same). 
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effective remedial action.84 Distinguishing between a supervisor and co-worker 
has obvious importance, and the Court ruled in a 2013 case, Vance v. Ball State 
University,85 that a harasser does not qualify as a supervisor unless he or she 
has the power to "take tangible employment actions against the victim"-
colloquially, the power to hire and fire. 86 This standard omits those employees 
who dictate many or all aspects of one's daily working conditions, but lack the 
ultimate power over one's job. 
The affirmative defense, which carves out an exception to a general rule of 
automatic liability, represents a key shift in Title VII law from an emphasis on 
substance to an emphasis on procedure. The question is not whether employers 
have successfully prevented or responded to problems of harassment, but 
whether they have erected an internal system designed to do those things-
whether successful or well-engineered or neither. As Justice Kennedy declared 
in Ellerth, the very purpose of Title VII is "to encourage the creation of 
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms."87 This shift was 
reinforced the following year in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n,88 in which 
the Court held that an employer may not be forced to pay punitive damages 
(which are authorized by statute) for supervisory harassment when the conduct 
is contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. 89 
After this burst of activity at the close of the twentieth century, including 
two key decisions on sexual harassment in the educational context,90 the Court 
84 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (stating that lower courts have "uniformly judg[ed] 
employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard"); see also id. 
(collecting cases); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.l l(d) (2002) ("With respect to conduct between fellow 
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where 
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the 
conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."). 
85 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
86 Id. at 2439. 
87 El/erth, 524 U.S. at 764. Justice O'Connor echoed this approach the following year in 
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999), declaring that law encourages 
employers "to adopt antidiscrimination policies and to educate their personnel on Title VII's 
prohibitions." Theresa Beiner has criticized courts for making voluntary compliance with 
prophylactic rules a central rather than collateral purpose of Title VII. See generally Theresa 
M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science 
Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 273 (2001) (reviewing literature on the training effect and victim response to 
harassment). 
88 527 U.S. 526, 545. 
89 Id. 
90 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that Title IX 
recipients are liable for harassment by students based on the same standard as for 
harassment by employees); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) 
(holding that Title IX recipients can be held liable for sexual harassment by teachers or 
other employees only if they have actual notice of the harassment and respond with 
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largely stepped back from the issue, allowing lower federal courts to start 
filling in the gaps. In addition to Vance, mentioned above, it decided only a 
handful of relatively narrow harassment cases in the first fifteen years of the 
next century, only two of which are worth noting.91 In Pennsylvania State 
Police v. Suders,92 the Court tackled the thorny question of constructive 
discharge, which was made more complicated by the Court's distinction in 
Faragher and Ellerth between the standards of liability for different types of 
harassment.93 In Suders, the plaintiff alleged that she quit her job with the state 
police because of pervasive sexual harassment by her supervisors and 
escalating harassment and derision when she complained.94 The Court ruled 
that constructive discharge constitutes a "tangible employment action"-
triggering automatic liability with no opportunity for the employer to prove the 
affirmative defense-only if the employee's resignation was precipitated by 
some official, employer-sanctioned adverse action.95 In National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Morgan,96 the Court held that hostile 
environment harassment is a so-called continuing violation such that a Title 
VII's relatively short statute of limitations (180 or 300 days, depending on the 
level of coordination between the federal and state anti-discrimination 
agencies) is triggered anew by each related incident.97 A complainant, then, 
can sue not only for the incident that occurred within the limitations period, but 
also for the whole course of acts that together comprised the hostile working 
environment. 98 
Over the course of almost three decades, courts constructed sexual 
harassment doctrine, and a cottage industry of anti-harassment advice, policies, 
and procedures developed in its wake. In the next section, I consider the 
questions that the fast-moving law left little time for: Did it work, and at what 
cost? 
III. THE MIDLIFE CRISIS: HA VE WE GONE Too FAR OR NOT FAR ENOUGH? 
A recent controversy over Harvard Law School's sexual harassment policy 
is somewhat emblematic of a larger debate. The federal Office for Civil Rights 
deliberate indifference);. 
91 Minor cases include Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001), 
in which the Court ruled that front pay is a form of equitable relief that is not subject to the 
damages cap under Title VII, and Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which it 
held that the employer-size requirement under Title VII was not jurisdictional in nature and 
therefore could be waived if not challenged at the appropriate time. 
92 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004). 
93 Id. at 137-40. 
94 Id. at 135-37. 
95 Id. at 148-49. 
96 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
97 Id. at 117. 
98 Id. at 117-19. 
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cited Harvard for a policy that did not go far enough to implement Title IX's 
prohibition of sexual harassment;99 meanwhile, its faculty protested publicly 
that the policy went too far, compromising the rights of the accused harassers 
and basic principles of fairness. 100 The broader academic debate about the 
direction of sexual harassment law raises a version of the same question: Has it 
gone too far or not far enough? 
The Supreme Court decisions that limn the contours of sexual harassment 
law are only the beginning of the story. With the cornerstones of the doctrine 
in place, the next phase of construction was left to lower federal courts and, 
perhaps more importantly, employers and their consultants trying to navigate 
the relatively new regime. A significant critique from the "not far enough" 
camp arises from the way in which lower federal courts fleshed out the 
doctrinal details. In turning the Supreme Court's broad brush pronouncements 
into a more detailed set of rules and standards, federal courts often 
misconstrued the intended scope of Title VII and narrowed the protections for 
victims of harassment. Let's consider just a handful of examples that support 
this critique. .. 
The Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense imposes, in effect, a poli'cy-and-
procedure requirement on employers and a prompt complaint requirement on 
harassed employees. According to the Court's articulation of the defense, an 
employer can avoid liability or damages if it has taken reasonable care to 
prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior and th.e plaintiff "unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer .... " 101 Armed with these instructions, lower federal courts 
issued a series of rulings that ignored the express terms of the defense, as well 
as the social realities of the workplace, and lost sight of the law's purpose of 
promoting employment equality through the elimination of sexually harassing 
behaviors. Several courts, for example, held that if an employer satisfies the 
first prong of the affirmative defense-the one focused on the employer's 
conduct-it does not also need to satisfy the second one, despite the Court's 
clear use of a conjunctive to join the two clauses and clear intent to err on the 
99 See Letter from Joel J. Bemer, Reg'l Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., 
to Martha Minow, Dean, Harv. Law Sch. 2-3 (Dec. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/docurnents/press-releases/harvard-law-letter.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2FTR-GHVT. 
100 See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Editorial, Rethink Harvard's Sexual Harassment 
Policy, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2014, at All. Faculty at Penn Law School published a similar 
"open letter," protesting its university's sexual assault procedures. See Members of the Penn 
Law School Faculty, Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused 
Students at Universities (Feb. 18, 2015), available at 
http://media.philly.com/docurnents/OpenLetter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CY3M-
YMPA. 
101 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
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side of employer liability. 102 Other courts took a strict and entirely unrealistic 
view of how quickly and assertively employees must complain103 about 
harassment and how many obstacles they must overcome to do so.104 Courts' 
refusals to consider context as a determinant of reasonableness is a thread that 
runs through contemporary discrimination law more generally, making anti-
discrimination rights among the hardest to enforce.1os 
At the same time courts were insisting that employees rush to file 
complaints for fear of forfeiting their substantive rights against discrimination, 
they were weakening the protections against retaliation. As discussed above, 
the Supreme Court has made grand proclamations about the harm of retaliation 
and the right to be protected from it. But doctrinal developments of those 
pronouncements have weakened the protection substantially and allowed a 
common problem to flourish. Moreover, less protection against retaliation 
provides a further deterrent to complaining, which, as discussed above, reduces 
an employee's ability to enforce substantive rights against harassment. The 
weakening has taken two primary forms. 
102 See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he 
ASP is entitled to a modified Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, despite the ASP's 
inability to prove the second element."); Watkins v. Prof! Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (finding that when the first element 
was satisfied, no reasonable jury could find an employer liable); Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 271 (5th Cir. 1999);. 
103 See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that a three-month delay was unreasonable as a matter of law); Madray v. 
Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
complaining to managers not designated by the policy is unreasonable for purposes of the 
affirmative defense); Green v. Wills Grp., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (D. Md. 2001) 
(holding that complaining to wrong person rendered victim's behavior unreasonable); 
Marsicano v. Am. Soc'y of Safety Eng'rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 4, 1998) (finding seven-day delay in complaining unreasonable even though 
harassment began on first day of employment). For a more exhaustive analysis of the 
affirmative defense caselaw, see Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The 
Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Grossman, Culture of Compliance]; Grossman, supra note 82, at 
704-15; L. Camille Hebert, Why Don't "Reasonable Women" Complain About Sexual 
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711 (2007). 
104 Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that "a 
generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment"); 
Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that being "too scared" 
is not a justification for failing to complain without evidence to substantiate such fears); Hill 
v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "apprehension does 
not eliminate the requirement that the employee report harassment"). 
105 For an exhaustive argument to this effect, see Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. 
Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859 
(2008). 
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First, the "materially adverse" standard set forth in Burlington Northern was 
interpreted with little concern for the context that surrounds the decision of an 
actual discrimination victim whether to complain. In Higgins v. Gonzales, 106 
for example, the Eighth Circuit ruled that withholding mentoring or 
supervision was insufficiently adverse to deter complaints-and therefore did 
not qualify as actionable retaliation. 107 Neither, the court suggested, would 
involuntary transfer to a different city, despite all the inconveniences of 
uprooting home and family. 108 Rather, the implication of Burlington Northern 
and its progeny is that reasonable employees are "resilient, self-sufficient, and 
willing to risk the loss of congenial relationships at work in exchange for the 
assertion of civil rights. " 109 
Second, courts have taken the "reasonable belief' doctrine casually 
suggested in Breeden and turned it into an almost insurmountable hurdle for 
retaliation claims brought under the opposition clause. Courts require 
retaliation plaintiffs to prove that they had sufficient factual evidence of 
discrimination before they complained-in a context where employers hold far 
more of the information than employees. This puts pressure on employees to 
lie low and gather evidence before complaining, while the prompt-filing 
doctrine discussed above counsels just the opposite. Moreover, the standard is 
so high in some jurisdictions that it equals the standard to survive summary 
judgment on the underlying discrimination claim-a standard that would only 
be applied after discovery had taken place. 110 Courts also require retaliation 
plaintiffs to show they had a reasonable belief that the conduct complained of 
was against the law-measured, by some courts, by their knowledge of 
existing law-including circuit-specific precedents.111 
106 481F.3d578, 585-86, 590 (8th Cir. 2007). 
107 Id at 585 ("Any lack of mentoring or supervision simply does not rise to the level of 
an adverse employment action, as she cannot establish the absence had any effect on her 
employment situation."). 
108 Id at 591; see also Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-6619, 2007 WL 
1028860, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007) (refusing to treat ostracism by management as 
materially adverse); McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that denial of transfer from night shift to day shift after supporting coworker's complaint of 
discrimination was not materially adverse). 
109 Brake & Grossman, supra note 105, at 907. 
110 See, e.g., Bazemore v. Georgia Tech. Auth., No. 1:05-CV-1850-WSD-WEJ, 2007 WL 
917280, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (concluding that belief of discrimination was 
unreasonable even though black plaintiff knew that white coworker who engaged in similar 
misconduct was not subjected to disciplinary action); Kennedy v. Guthrie Pub. Sch., No. 
CIV-05-1440-F, 2007 WL 895145, at *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2007) (concluding that 
plaintiffs perception of discrimination was unreasonable where he knew that eleven white 
high school principals were given raises, but he, a black high school principal, was not). 
111 See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1312 (I Ith Cir. 2002) 
("[P]laintiffs may not stand on their ignorance of the substantive law to argue that their 
belief was reasonable."); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 
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The examples discussed in this section are far from exhaustive, but they are 
illustrative of twin trends to narrow substantive protections against harassment 
(despite the Supreme Court's broad pronouncements) and erect procedural 
obstacles that make those protections even more elusive. Thus. despite more 
than thirty years of doctrinal development and broad proclamations about its 
interference with equal employment opportunity, sexual harassment remains 
disturbingly common and unaddressed. 112 Perhaps worse, the law has done 
little to change the cultural understanding of sexual misconduct and the ways 
in which it impedes workplace equality. We are left instead with a somewhat 
confused doctrine that rewards the proliferation of policies and procedures, but 
never inquires whether they have had the desired effect. 113 
While some voices criticize sexual harassment law for stopping short of its 
goal, others complain of its overreach. Vicki Schultz, for example, published a 
powerful critique of sexual harassment doctrine, in which she argued that the 
law has facilitated a "neo-Taylorist project of suppressing sexuality and 
intimacy in the workplace . . . without even inquiring into whether that 
behavior undermines gender equality on the job."114 Schultz faults current 
doctrine for failing to distinguish between harmless sexual behavior and 
discriminatory sexual behavior-and for being satisfied by the elimination of 
sex from the workplace, regardless of whether sex-based conduct continues to 
701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff's retaliation claim for lack of reasonable belief; 
plaintiffs complaint of sexual orientation discrimination was not objectively reasonable 
because such discrimination is not prohibited under Title VII); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., 
Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (!Ith Cir. 1999) (measuring plaintiffs underlying claims of 
sexual harassment against "existing substantive law" and whether conduct was "severe or 
pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive" in a retaliation 
claim). 
112 For varied criticism of sexual harassment law's inefficacy, see THERESA M. BEINER, 
GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW (2005) (arguing that the disconnect between judicial assumptions about 
typical responses to workplace harassment and the social realities undermines the law's 
efficacy); LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 24, at 72 (discussing critique that civil rights 
victories of the 1970s "are being quietly rolled back by lax enforcement officers and hostile 
judges"); Brake & Grossman, supra note 105; Hebert, supra note 103, at 715 (arguing that 
the rules of employer liability have been applied "in ways quite hostile to the interests of 
women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests of employers 
whose supervisory employees have been accused of sexual harassment"). 
113 For more on this critique, see Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 103. 
114 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003); see also 
Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: 
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) ("Until we know much more 
about anti-discrimination training and its effects, the existence of sexual harassment or 
diversity programs should not be considered a fact relevant to employer liability for 
compensatory damages in any discrimination suit."). 
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oppress. 115 Janet Halley argues that we should "take a break from feminism" 
and rethink the treatment of sexuality in law. 116 These and other feminist 
critiques of sexual harassment law do not question the existence of inequality, 
but rather whether the law is focusing on the right conduct or the right 
categories, and whether it is being effectively deployed. 
CONCLUSION 
The fiftieth anniversary of Title VII provides an appropriate occasion to 
look back-in this case, to an era when women suffered sexual abuse in the 
workplace (and many other places) with no possible recourse. Once feminist 
writers and litigators connected the dots, judges came to understand that a 
broad mandate to end sex discrimination had to include a mandate to eliminate 
sexual harassment at work. The decades that followed saw the step-by-step 
construction of a doctrine that ostensibly protects employees from unwanted 
sexual behavior at work. The question for the next decade is whether the 
structure we have created is doing the job we want-and what changes might 
be justified. 
115 Schultz, supra note 114, at 2064; see also Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with 
Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 746 (1997) ("Shutting down all sexual behavior 
seems like an overreaction to the problem of sexual harassment, and requires some very 
disturbing assumptions about the possibility offemale sexual agency .... "). 
116 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 
(2006). Sexual harassment law has also been critiqued from libertarian perspectives for 
unjustifiably restraining speech and for invading employee privacy. See, e.g., Eugene 
Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 
(1992) (urging courts to distinguish between targeted sexual speech and undirected speech). 
Some feminists have cited similar concerns. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED 
GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRJV ACY IN AMERICA 13 (2000) ("Because it is difficult to 
know in advance what kind of sexually related behavior or speech a reasonable juror might 
find hostile or offensive, prudent employers and school administrators, in an effort to avoid 
liability, have a strong incentive to monitor and punish far more private speech and conduct 
than the law actually forbids."); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the 
Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
